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Abstract
Social networks can be used to represent group structure as a network of interacting components, and also to quantify both
the position of each individual and the global properties of a group. In a series of simulation experiments based on dynamic
social networks, we test the prediction that social behaviors that help individuals reach prominence within their social
group may conflict with their potential to benefit from their social environment. In addition to cases where individuals were
able to benefit from improving both their personal relative importance and group organization, using only simple rules of
social affiliation we were able to obtain results in which individuals would face a trade-off between these factors. While
selection would favor (or work against) social behaviors that concordantly increase (or decrease, respectively) fitness at both
individual and group level, when these factors conflict with each other the eventual selective pressure would depend on the
relative returns individuals get from their social environment and their position within it. The presented results highlight the
importance of a systems approach to studying animal sociality, in which the effects of social behaviors should be viewed
not only through the benefits that those provide to individuals, but also in terms of how they affect broader social
environment and how in turn this is reflected back on an individual’s fitness.
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Introduction
Fitness of an individual in a social context is affected by its own
social behavior and that of its social partners. The interaction
patterns produced by such behaviors affect each individual
differently, depending on its position within the group structure
[1]. However, not all group structures have the same effect on
their constituent members. For example, some organization
patterns may be better at transmitting information between
various group components [2], while others may be better at
accumulating and processing it [3]. As it is likely that such
differently organized groups will result in the emergence of
individuals that will not have identical social roles, either within or
across these groups, it follows that fitness of an individual in a
social setting will depend not only on its own position within that
group’s organization, but also on the way the group is organized as
a whole.
Within such groups, each individual will also influence the
fitness of its partners through its interactions [4–6], and the
respective interaction pattern of that individual will determine its
specific contribution as well as define its personal position in the
group. For example, some individuals will have many direct
interactions, and will therefore be able to affect more partners
more easily [7,8], while in others having few interactions may in
fact be characteristic of dominant individuals [1]. In either case,
social behavior of each individual will not only determine its own
position within the group, but also contribute to the group
structure, and will accordingly affect fitness returns the individual
gets from both factors. If the organization of the group as it is
defined by the interaction pattern of each individual was not
predetermined, such structure can then be seen as the emergent
property of the group [9–11], arising from individual social
behaviors but also providing fitness consequences that cannot be
predicted by observing the individual interactions alone.
Social networks have a long and successful history of being used
to represent group structure as a network of interacting
components [12–14]. In biology, those components are individ-
uals, represented as nodes in a network, while their interactions are
represented as links, or edges, between the nodes [15–18]. The
relative importance of each node in a network can then be
characterized using various measures of position and connectivity
within the network, which are referred to as centrality metrics in
network theory [12,16]. One major advantage of social networks
lies in their flexibility: there are many different ways to define
centrality, just as there are many ways to define importance in a
social group [12–14,16]. Centrality of an individual node in a
network depends on its connection pattern, just as, for example,
the definition of an alpha individual in a social group depends on
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on the kind of centrality used, its value can then be related to its
immediate neighbors, more distant components of the network, or
both. However, in addition to characterizing the relative position
of each individual component within the network, social networks
can also be used to characterize the overall structure of the group,
using group-wide centrality metrics to quantify the level of
organization according to some criterion [20,21]. This ability to
combine individual and group properties in analysis makes social
networks ideal to study how social behaviors, such as decisions
whether and with whom to interact, can lead to distinct selective
pressures from both social position of each individual and group
organization.
However, testing this paradigm empirically in computational
simulation experiments requires several assumptions to link
centrality and fitness. First, we will assume that individuals
enjoying higher centrality will also be able to benefit more from
their social environment. The assumption of advantageous social
position could equally well be linked to lower centrality, since we
will focus on general trends. In other words, we do not intend to
propose a link between high centrality and high fitness in social
systems found in animal groups, or indeed that centrality is in any
way a determinant rather than a correlate of some fitness benefits
immanent in social position [1–3]. Rather, we will simply use high
centrality as a way to contrast different scenarios used in our
simulations. Second, we will assume that individuals will benefit
from having important partners, and will thus prefer those over
less central ones. Again, even though there are striking examples in
animal social systems, such as well-connected elephant matriarchs
leading the herd to resources [3] or beta male white-tailed
manikins benefiting from connectedness of their respective alphas
to females [1], we do not claim that high centrality individuals will
be, or should be perceived as, a defining characteristic of desirable
social partners in all, or even in the majority of, animal social
systems. Finally, we will assume that greater levels of group
organization will impart greater benefits to individuals in a group.
While an increasing body of evidence suggests that various aspects
of colony organization in social insects contributes to the overall
colony success [22,23], distributive decision-making processes
could be equally adaptive in other groups [24,25]. However, for
the purpose of our models, social behaviors that lead to greater
level of group-wide organization will be treated as if they also
improve the fitness of individuals. Thus, the behaviors that
produce them will be treated as if being under positive selection in
our models, just as would those that improve its personal
centrality. In sum, the motivation behind each of the three
assumptions is that individuals should behave selfishly and
therefore exhibit social behaviors that benefit them regardless of
how such benefit is obtained.
Combining these three assumptions outlines a social environ-
ment in which it is on one hand beneficial to be central, as this will
benefit the individual both directly and by making it a more
desirable partner, and on the other it is also beneficial to live in a
highly organized, efficient group. To simulate such a social system,
we used a dynamic network environment in which we were able to
model not only how individual affiliation choices affected the fate
of individuals that exhibited them, but also the emergence of
group organization from individual behaviors. Thus, in these
models the group structure was neither static nor predetermined,
and the individuals were freely associating with their partners.
Moreover, the only mechanism that influenced their social choice
on whether to remain connected to particular partners was based
on the perceived importance of those partners. The social
dynamics in these systems was therefore based on dropping
connections to some partners, those perceived as less desirable
social partners, and randomly adding new partners of unknown
desirability.
To explore a potential diversity of emergent group structures
that arose from this simple drop/add process, we used three
different centrality criteria to guide affiliations of individuals in a
network based on directed connections: Popularity (P; also referred
to as in-degree), Closeness (C), and Betweenness (B) (sensu Freeman
[12]). These three measures of relative importance were then used
to evaluate their social partners and guide their social choices,
yielding P-networks, C-networks, and B-networks, respectively.
The results from each of those were then compared to those
obtained from random affiliation networks, or R-networks, in
which individuals were unable to assess the centrality of their
existing affiliations, and therefore dropped connections at random
rather than dropping those perceived to be the least desirable
partners. While the mathematical details of these centrality
measures, as well as the exact rules of how dynamic directed
networks were constructed, are given in the Methods section, it is
important to note that in our simulations we do not assume that
any of these metrics is a direct analog of biological fitness in all, or
indeed in the majority of, social contexts. Nevertheless, depending
on the social context in which it is observed, i.e. what interactions
in a network represent, these metrics can, and have been, used to
identify individuals that would appear to benefit more or less from
the social environment [1,2,16–18]. Therefore, these measures can
be used as correlates of social components of fitness under certain
conditions, and their use to describe biological systems is not
unprecedented. For example, high Popularity could characterize
individuals that receive many behaviors directed at them, such as
grooming [26]; high Closeness can define individuals that are able
to easily and rapidly reach others in a group, but also rapidly
transmit infectious agents [7,8]; and high Betweenness can be
viewed as the network position of an individual that characterizes
it as a necessary intermediary or ‘information bottleneck’ in a
group or population [2]. Moreover, these metrics differ concep-
tually in the way in which individuals can become more desirable
partners when connecting to others in networks where connections
are directed, i.e. where both initiator and target of each social
connection are known: Popularity enhances the desirability of
partners while doing nothing for the actor; Closeness has no effect
on either actor or recipient; and Betweenness generally enhances
the desirability of both actor and recipient of the connection.
While there are many other metrics that can also be used in such
studies [12–18], for this initial study these metrics provide
sufficiently diverse examples of how importance can be defined
in a group.
In very basic terms, as social behaviors change the interaction
pattern of an individual in a group, they will have either positive or
negative consequences for its personal social position in a social
structure of that group. Similarly, they will also positively or
negatively affect the group organization. When these effects are
then combined, we can distinguish four different outcomes in
which these factors can be concordant with or conflict with each
other (Figure 1). While selective pressures will be synergistic when
social behaviors concordantly increase (or decrease) fitness by
improving (or compromising) both individual position and group
organization, there could also be cases when the directions of these
selective pressures will be in conflict. Certain behaviors may
increase the fitness of an individual by making its social position
more advantageous while at the same time decreasing the viability
of, and the benefits this individual receives from, its social
environment. Alternatively, some behaviors could increase the
efficiency of group organization while preventing individuals from
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group. In the latter case, the individuals may then profit indirectly
from having particular partners in a group, such as partners that
happen to be very central in some way, and without necessarily
becoming central themselves (e.g. a member of a herd led by a
successful matriarch, as in McComb et al. [3]). The resulting
overall direction of selective pressure would therefore depend on
the relative magnitude of these effects (cf. Figure 1). Demonstrat-
ing the possibility of obtaining such outcomes in a simulated
environment, with only very simple affiliation rules directing social
choice, will help raise awareness about and inspire studies to
examine indirect effects of sociality as they relate to the properties
of a system as a whole.
Results
Before being able to determine whether social behavior can lead
to concordant or conflicting tendencies between improving
personal social position and group organization, we define the
basic criteria of success in our simulations. As high centrality is
used in our simulations to be analogous to high utility of sociality,
we used both an individual’s ability to attain high centrality and
maintain it afterwards as a criterion for personal success. Group
success was correspondingly defined as a high level of group-wide
centrality in the simulation run. As the results of group
organization were identical to those of Fefferman & Ng [21],
they are not explicitly reported here but rather used for
comparison purposes. For methodological details on how to
define and determine group-wide centrality, readers are thus
referred to their exhaustive descriptions in Fefferman and Ng [21].
When the ability of an individual to attain high centrality in a
network was used as a criterion for its success in a group,
individuals in affiliation-driven networks generally fared better
than in R-networks (Figure 2). With the exception of P-networks
not raising the B-centrality value above those obtained from R-
networks, affiliation-driven networks were better at improving
both P-centrality and B-centrality (B-centrality x
2(3,N=1200)=
513.11, p,0.0001; P-centrality x
2(3,N=1200)=1137.7, p,0.0001;
p,0.05 for all multiple comparisons with R-network values except
B-centrality in P-networks). Nevertheless, highest values of C-
centrality were recorded in R-networks (C-centrality x
2(3,N=
1200)=943.54, p,0.0001; p,0.05 for all multiple comparisons
with R-network values). Affiliation preferences therefore increased
the maximum attainable personal P- and B-centrality in networks.
However, this was not a specific phenomenon, as all affiliations, and
not just those using P- and B-centrality to guide social choice,
elevated these measures. In contrast, maximization of attainable C-
centrality occurred when no affiliation preference was used to guide
social choice.
Networks significantly differed in the ability of individuals to
keep on increasing their centrality rank (B-centrality F3, 1196 =
13.13, p,0.0001; C-centrality F3, 1196 =3.75, p=0.01; P-
centrality F3, 1196 =30.27, p,0.0001) (Table 1). While individuals
in P-networks experienced significant upward trends for all
centrality metrics with respect to the R-networks, those in the B-
networks were able to do so only for B- and P-centrality ranks. In
contrast, individuals in C-networks did not exhibit any such
tendencies. This suggests that individuals were not only able to
attain higher success by using B- and P-centrality to guide social
choice, but also that significantly more of them would experience
increasing trends to improve their relative importance than in R-
networks. While this also suggests that some individuals were
dropping in rank, the incentive to use affiliation rules was still
higher for the listed networks than if no affiliation preferences were
used.
To determine whether individuals could expect to maintain
increased personal centrality while social dynamics processes
continue, we compared the numbers of individuals consistently
maintaining higher than initial rank in affiliation-driven networks
to those observed in the R-networks (Figure 3). Significant
differences between networks were recorded for all centrality
metrics (B-centrality F3, 659.91 =1480.32, p,0.0001; C-centrality
F3, 1196 =32.19, p,0.0001; P-centrality F3, 657.05 =1980.75,
p,0.0001). In both B- and P-networks, significantly more
individuals per network consistently maintained higher than initial
ranks than were observed for R-networks. The expectations in C-
networks were comparable to R-networks. As, individuals in B- or
P-networks were able to maintain B- and P-centrality ranks that
were higher than their initial ranks, they were able to remain more
central for extended periods of time (while no such trends were
detected for C-networks). The affiliation rules thus allowed them
to keep their elevated importance in a group once it was achieved,
and enjoy any potential benefits that could come with it. As in B-
and P-networks both B- and P-centrality were consistently
increased, the correlation between the two metrics would suggest
that cues for one metric could be used as a reliable proxy of the
other [21]. When these results on individual centrality are taken
together, we conclude that individuals were able to successfully
raise their P-centrality in either B- or P-networks, that they would
do best to raise their B-centrality in a B-network (or perhaps P-
network if stability of elevated social position was more important
than attainable maximum), and that none of the affiliation-driven
networks were useful for raising C-centrality, the values for which
were the highest in R-networks.
Most interestingly, whether the relative centrality results of
individuals in modeled networks were in concordance with or in
Figure 1. Conceptual representation of selective pressure
outcomes for social behaviors based on their potential fitness
consequences. Fitness an individual gets from its social environment
will depend not only on its own individual position within the group
(IND), but also on the way the group is organized as a whole (ORG).
When the effects of both factors increase the fitness of an individual,
the driving social behavior is under positive selective pressure. When
both factors decrease fitness, the behavior is counter-selected. When
these factors are in conflict, their relative magnitude will determine the
net selective pressure, and the factor with a greater relative magnitude
will determine the direction of selection for such behavior. When both
factors have the same magnitude but are in conflict with each other,
their effects will be at equilibrium and the behavior will be under
stabilizing selection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015789.g001
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(as reported in Fefferman and Ng [21]) was dependent on the
network type (Table 2). In P-networks, the expected increase of
personal P-centrality of individuals was concordant with higher
group-wide P-centrality. This suggests that social behavior based
on P-centrality would experience positive selective pressure from
both factors, as follows from assumptions of advantageous high
centrality we used in our models. Conversely, no network was
more successful at increasing C-centrality either at individual or
group-wide level than the R-network (with any positive trends in
P-networks being potentially offset by the negative expectation to
maintain increased rank). This suggests that attempts to maximize
C-centrality would not benefit from using C-centrality of potential
partners as an affiliation cue, and that such behaviors would be
selected against. Unlike the previous two centrality metrics, groups
attempting to maximize B-centrality would face conflicting
influences at the level of individual and group-wide B-centralities.
Personal B-centrality will be increased in B- (and potentially P-)
networks, but the highest levels of group-wide B-centrality will be
achieved in C- and R-networks. This would therefore result in
conflicting pressures on individuals in these networks, and the
selective pressure on such behaviors would therefore result in a
trade-off between individual and group-wide returns, ultimately
depending on the relative magnitude of the returns from each
effect. Thus, using just simple affiliation behaviors in a network of
socially defined, but otherwise identical, individuals, we were able
to replicate all hypothesized outcomes from Figure 1.
Discussion
Fitness of an individual is inextricably linked with the
characteristics of its social environment. However, not all
individuals in an interacting group of individuals will have the
same role or relative social position [27]. The relative importance
and social position of each individual within its group will in turn
depend on the attributes of its partners and the pattern of its
interactions [1–3]. The contributions of sociality to fitness, i.e. the
extent to which interactions with other individuals affect the fitness
of a focal individual, will therefore depend both on interaction
partners that comprise individual’s social environment and its
relative position within that environment. The associated pressures
should then determine whether behaviors that lead to beneficial
social organization will be favored by selection. The results of our
simulation experiments demonstrate that it is possible to get either
concordant or conflicting pressures between group organization
and individual profiling, even when using simple affiliation rules to
guide social choice.
In animal populations, highly complex social organization can
result from a uniform set of very simple operational rules [9], and
such algorithms have been applied to diverse questions like the
nest-site selective algorithms of ants [28], population persistence of
mammals [3,29,30], long-term reproductive success in birds [1],
and self-organization of primate groups [11,31]. However, the
effect that group organization, as an emergent property, has on
individuals received surprisingly little attention to date. Evolution-
Figure 2. Comparing maximum attainable centrality across networks. With the exception of B-centrality in P-networks (labeled as ns), all
affiliation preferences raised values of P- and B-centrality metric above those recorded in R-networks. In contrast, none of the affiliation-driven
networks were able to raise the values of C-centrality above those recorded in R-network. The box plots indicate descriptive statistics: median,
quartiles, maxima and minima; horizontal line in each graph indicates the grand mean for the respective centrality metric.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015789.g002
Table 1. The number of individuals per network type that
satisfied the criterion of substantial upward trend in centrality.
Network Type
Centrality
Metric B C P R
B 344/222* 207/152 372/219* 208/154
C 221/153 178/141 238/169* 188/140
P 300/190* 217/156 329/200* 209/160
To satisfy the criterion of substantial upward trend in centrality, individuals had
to increase their relative centrality rank 7 or more (out of 9) times between
successive time intervals for a given centrality metric. The results indicate the
total number of individuals (in bold print) that satisfied the criterion/number of
networks in which at least one individual that satisfied this criterion was
recorded. Non-random networks in which the average number of individuals
per network was significantly different from the respective R-networks in
multiple comparisons are denoted with *.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015789.t001
Figure 3. Comparing individuals that successfully maintained
increased centrality rank for 7 or more time intervals. B- and P-
networks had significantly more such individuals than R-networks for all
metrics. C-networks were indistinguishable from the R-networks.
Metrics that were significantly different from those in R-networks in
multiple comparisons are denoted with *. The box plots indicate
descriptive statistics: median, quartiles, maxima and minima.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015789.g003
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mechanism should be favored by selection [32]. With regard to
fitness consequences that stem from sociality, selective pressures
may act to increase the direct gains an individual expects to attain
in a group in relation to its peers, and/or to increase indirect,
distributive benefits conferred to it by the successful organization
of its social environment. If indirect benefits to all individuals in a
group arise from the organization of a group where social
connections become concentrated in a few individuals, as is
observed e.g. in social networks of African elephants [3], the
selective pressure would favor the emergence of a group-wide
centrality built around these key individuals. Conversely, if benefits
stem from a distributive decision-making system, as is the case in
many social groups without a prominent central individual
[24,25], selection will favor low centrality at the group level, even
though it might be beneficial for individuals to be personally
central. As long as indirect benefits from such arrangements
outweigh any costs to individuals, such as loss of personal
centrality in either centralized or decentralized groups, the
mechanisms that favor such arrangement will be under positive
selective pressure.
Social behaviors that benefit individuals by concordantly
increasing the likelihood that they will be favorably positioned in
their group and the benefits they get from membership in their
respective group will clearly be favored by selection. These
conditions are well illustrated by the results of P-networks, where,
in their attempts to achieve high P-centrality in a simulation,
individuals were able to both increase relative personal P-centrality
and also use the same set of rules as the best option to maximize
group-wide P-centrality. Thus, if increased P-centrality was
associated with fitness benefits from sociality, as was assumed in
our models and as it could also be the case in some biological
networks (such as those based on allogrooming [26]), groups
organized as P-networks would be successful at increasing
individuals’ fitness both directly and indirectly.
In contrast to such synergistic positive effect, social affiliation
behaviors could also result in conditions where returns from both
personal position and group-wide organization are concordantly
negative. In such cases, behaviors that lead to this kind of result
will be under a negative selective pressure. Networks based on C-
centrality affiliation preferences are an example of just such
conditions. Not only were the individuals unable to experience
levels of relative personal centrality beyond those in randomly
organized networks, but also the group-wide C-centrality was at its
greatest under the same randomized circumstances. Assuming that
C-centrality was associated with high fitness, we expect that
individuals would be under negative selective pressure to use C-
centrality as a cue for social affiliations and group organization.
Thus, and somewhat counterintuitively, individuals should be
either oblivious to the cues that signal high social fitness when
choosing partners, or even be primed to actively avoid these cues.
Conversely, if it was in fact low C-centrality that was analogous to
increased fitness, individuals could use organizational rules that
would hamper the emergence of high C-centrality individuals in a
group (perhaps also ensuring that they themselves would not
emerge as one), as was observed in our affiliation-driven networks.
Given that C-centrality involves individuals aiming to be
connected to other individuals in the shortest number of steps,
such mechanisms could potentially be interpreted as interacting
groups organized in a way that slows the spread of disease and
eliminates the emergence of ‘superspreaders’ in a group [7,8,33].
Selecting to affiliate with partners of particular quality could
also increase the benefits that individuals get from their social
environment. Using a hypothetical example, if individuals benefit
by preferring to affiliate with partners that accumulate information
through their numerous social connections, they would likely also
benefit from group organization that favors greater overall
accumulation of information in at least some individuals.
However, it is intriguing that there could be behaviors which
would help individuals accumulate more information at the
expense of group-wide information accumulation. Alternatively,
this could also mean that the indirect benefits from group
organization and social partners could compensate for seemingly
suboptimal position of an individual in a group. Maximization of
B-centrality provides an example of such conflicting influences at
the individual- and group-level. Being connected to the high
quality intermediaries increases the personal quality of the
individual as an intermediary [34]. Accordingly, personal B-
centrality was increased in B-networks. However, the group-wide
increase of B-centrality was the greatest in C- and R-networks. If
high B-centrality is assumed to be analogous to increased fitness,
the network of choice would therefore be unclear. This example
could reflect situations in which the benefits of having only a few
individuals that act as ‘brokers’ within or between groups [2] is
contrasted with distributive information processing through
consensus decisions [24,25]. In such cases, social behaviors result
in a trade-off between direct personal benefits and advantageous
social organization. Therefore, the eventual selective pressure on
exhibited social behaviors will depend on the relative magnitude of
the returns the individuals get from these two factors.
The biological examples supporting these tradeoffs abound,
both in the terms of experimentally determined parameters and
theoretical considerations. Groups of social animals may be
organized so as to maximize the centralized [35] or distributive,
consensual decision-making processes [25]. Concentrating benefits
that can be accrued through social interactions in particular
members of a group may therefore lead to an increased fitness for
other participants [2,3,36], and as a result their emergence may be
favored by selection and indirectly supported by behaviors of all
group members. Conversely, these benefits may be offset by the
increased risks for such individuals, for example from metabolic
costs of dominance [37,38], or risks they pose to others, such as
their increased propensity to transmit infectious agents [7,8,33] or
disrupt reproduction through hyper-aggressiveness [39]. Further-
more, the interaction patterns in some cases may be used by
animals to minimize the impacts of an unfavorable social situation,
and individuals may benefit from social organization even though
they themselves do not occupy the most prominent social roles in
their groups. For example, even non-central individuals benefit
from group organization when it is based on directed allogrooming
behaviors [26], or when it primes the actor for a future, more
successful social role [1]. Finally, efficient social organization may
Table 2. Comparison of individual and group-wide results.
Network of Choice
Metric to
Increase Group-wide Individual Concordant?
Pressure to
organize
B C, R B (or P) NO ?
C R R YES NEGATIVE
P B, P B, P YES POSITIVE
Maximization of B-centrality was ambiguous, with conflicting pressures. C-
centrality maximization was under uniform pressure that did not favor
organization. P-centrality maximization was under uniform pressure to organize
using either B- or P-networks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015789.t002
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while centralization may be accompanied by increased cognitive
capacities that allow for management of this social information
[40], increased efficiency of group organization may in fact allow
for a reduced sophistication and connectivity of individuals in a
group [41].
While both personal social position and social organization of a
group benefit individuals embedded in such groups, it is intriguing
to interpret these results from the multilevel selection standpoint. If
the emergence of efficient group organization is dependent on the
behavioral phenotype shared by at least a portion of individuals that
constitute a group, as is the case with trait-group concept [42],
group organization could be viewed in the context of emergent
properties characterizing groups. Theoretical considerations backed
by recent empirical evidence would suggest that organization of
animal social groups may be key to their success [22,43–45].
However, in contrast to the efforts where fitness is evaluated over
generations [46,47], our results demonstrate how differences in
survival can instantly arise from social behaviors, and do so even if
all individuals exhibit only a single, simple, and non-plastic
phenotype. Moreover, while benefits to the individual are key to
evolutionary success, competition to improve personal position
within a group may negatively affect others, leading to decreased
viabilityofsocialenvironment.Thesuccessofindividualsembedded
insocialgroupsmaythereforedependontheirpersonalprominence
as well as their effect on other group members, and fitness will be
maximized in individuals that are best able to balance these factors.
Thus, some social environments may provide individuals with
advantages over other, differently organized groups. Again, using
the hypothetical information accumulation example, groups that
are able to accumulate more information due to their structuring
will be able to outcompete other, less efficiently organized groups.
More detailed studies on particular mechanisms of how this could
occur are currently ongoing (Hock and Fefferman, in preparation).
In our models, however, group-wide benefits are not simply
equivalent to average group benefits. Group organization in our
simulations was treated as an emergent property that stems from
individual social behaviors. Thus, it is not a simple average of
centrality of individuals, but rather a derived characteristic of a
group. As such, it is possible that individuals will suffer negative
selective pressure from inefficient group organization, and thus
decrease net fitness of individuals not just in comparison with other
groups, but also without any intergroup competition. In other
words, certain actions that are advantageous to an actor may also
diminish the fitness of everyone else in the group, ultimately
decreasing the fitness of everyone involved: including themselves.
Hyper-aggressiveness may be such example [39], in which
individuals exhibit behaviors that benefit them under some
circumstances, e.g. increase their own mating opportunities, but
are ultimately detrimental, decreasing the number of offspring an
individual would be able to produce if no group member behaved
in this way. Thus, while some behaviors may be individually
adaptive, they could be disruptive in a broader social context.
Competition among colonies could be another example where
such considerations could be important, for example in social
insects where the importance of colony structure could determine
success in competition among colonies [22].
Insum,ourresultshighlight the importanceofasystemsapproach
to studying animal sociality. When considering fitness of individuals
in a social context, the focus has traditionally been on studying how
successful each individual is within its respective interaction group.
We propose that equal attention should be devoted to also consider
how anindividual’sactionsaffectits socialenvironmentandhow this
in turn will be reflected back on its personal fitness. The ability of
social networks to quantify both individual position and group
organization promises new and exciting ways how these powerful
tools could be used to study animal sociality. By looking at both
directandindirectbenefitsindividualsreceivefromthesocialcontext
within which they are embedded, and by taking into account
personal position as well as emergent properties of a group, the
current study provides a quantitative framework for future studies of
social organization of animal groups.
Methods
Overview
Few analytical tools provide such a breadth of opportunities to
study the structure of social systems as social network analysis.
Social systems are often complex, and the overall social
environment is a product of many individual decisions and
behaviors exhibited by its constituent members. To understand the
fundamental principles of how social structure emerges from
individual actions, we need methods to quantify the outcome both
for each member of a social system and the functioning of a system
as a whole. Social networks offer just such an analytical framework
by quantitatively characterizing both the positions of individual
entities and the overall structure of the network.
Using dynamic network models in a simulated social group, it is
therefore possible to demonstrate that the social behavior of
individuals may either aid or disrupt organization of the group. Just
as an individual’s decisions impact its direct social partners and its
social environment in general, its behavior will affect its own
position in its local social group, as well as its position in the overall
social structure. We will use a simple example to illustrate various
outcomes of individual behavioral decisions on both the individual
and the wider social environment. Under the assumption that such
advantages can be described using network metrics, we designed a
simulation study to test whether behavioral decisions aimed at
improving some measure analogous to a certain social position also
necessarily positively affect the overall organization of a social
group, or whether some behavioral strategies may in fact lead to
conflicting outcomes between these effects. While we in no way
mean to suggest that biological fitness is directly analogous to
network centrality, we hope that demonstrating the generality of
such paradigm even in such simple context will stimulate future
research in this area, especially the often overlooked aspect of
looking at a social group as a system with emergent properties that
cannot be predicted from individual components alone.
Social networks and centrality
To examine the impact of individual choice in dynamic social
affiliation on the social success of the participating individuals, we
built upon the series of models presented in Fefferman and Ng
[21] in which individuals constantly re-evaluated the relative
‘quality’ of their affiliates and maintained or discontinued these
affiliations accordingly in social groups resembling small world
networks [48]. Though many different centrality metrics exist in
social network analysis (each capturing different aspects of social
position or organization within a connected social group
[13,14,16]), we chose three basic, traditional centrality measures
broadly used in the field of social network theory. The social
quality of an individual in the presented models was thus
contingent on one of the three different centrality measures [12]:
(1) Popularity (P; also called in-degree), (2) Closeness (C), and (3)
Betweenness (B). These particular metrics were chosen without
intention to imply any potential importance in characterization of
animal groups: indeed, a wide variety of social network metrics
exists and the list of useful parameters continues to grow. Rather,
Systems Approach and Sociality
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made them intuitive candidates to demonstrate the potential range
of relative outcomes that are possible in a social system. More
specifically, rather than focusing on what these metrics may or
may not characterize in any given social system or animal group,
we used them to investigate general trends and directionality of
such trends that socially embedded individuals may encounter.
Though for modeling purposes we assumed that high centrality at
both individual and group level was advantageous in terms of
payoffs individuals would get from sociality, the situation may well
be completely opposite in some animal social systems. The general
nature of our models does not preclude such contrasting
conclusions: it simply highlights the possibility of observing
different combinations of individual and group-wide trends, as
well as the potential importance of, often overlooked, benefits
individuals could get from their wider social environment.
In the modeled interacting groups, individuals were represented in
a digraph environment, where connections between individuals
specified not only the identity of the connected individuals, but also
the directionality of interactions, identifying which individuals were
the initiators of the recorded social affiliations. Individuals dynam-
ically evaluated the relative levels of the three centrality measures that
characterized them as more or lessattractive social partners, and used
these measures to guide their decisions in social affiliation. While
individuals preferred to maintain affiliation with individuals exhib-
iting comparatively high values of a particular centrality measure, we
in no way mean to suggest that these three measures (from among
many defined already by social network theorists to examine different
facets of organizational success) are by themselves advantageous for
fitness, or of any particular importance in choosing social partners in
any particular animal social system. They are, however, easily
distinguishable and sufficiently diverse so as to demonstrate a variety
of ways in which individual actions may or may not result in
concordant individual- and group-level outcomes.
Defining network environment and centrality metrics
To explore the distribution of centrality values in an interacting
group under each of the dynamic affiliation strategies, we designed
a directed graph (or digraph) environment. Each node in the
graph represents a particular individual in the network and a
directed edge from one vertex to another represents a directed
connection (or affiliation) between the pair of individuals. More
precisely, if G is the digraph, we let the set V(G)={ v1, v2,…, vn}t o
be the set of nodes and E(G) to be the set of edges in G. We say that
vi is adjacent to vj (or vj is adjacent from vi) if there is an edge in G
from vi to vj. In this case, vj is said to be an out-neighbor of vi. The
in-degree of a node vi, denoted by din(vi), is the number of nodes in
G that has vi as an out-neighbor. The distance between nodes vi
and vj, denoted by d(vi,vj), is the length of the shortest path from vi
to vj in G. If there is no path between vi and vj in G, we set d(vi,vj)t o
be equal to n defined as the number of nodes in G.
The three widely used measures of centrality from social
network studies are defined as follows:
a. The Popularity centrality measure of a node vi, denoted by
P(vi) is defined to be




a. Note that the maximum value of P(vi) is 1 when every other
node of G has vi as an out-neighbor. As such, Popularity (that
is, in-degree) measures the number of social connections that
connect to the focal individual in a group.
b. The Closeness centrality measure of a node vi, denoted by C(vi)
is defined to be





   :
b. Note that the maximum value of C(vi) is 1 when every other
node of G is an out-neighbor of vi. As such, Closeness
measures the number of steps needed for the information
originating from the focal individual to reach every other
individual in a group.
c. Let S be the set of all shortest paths between all pairs of nodes
in G and count(vi) be the number of shortest paths in S that
contains node vi as an intermediate node. The Betweenness
centrality measure of a node vi, denoted by B(vi) is defined to
be
Bv i ðÞ ~
2count vi ðÞ
n{1 ðÞ n{2 ðÞ
:
c. Note that the maximum value of B(vi) is attained when vi is a
necessary intermediary that connects all pairs of two other
nodes in a network via the shortest available route. As such,
Betweenness measures the number of shortest paths
between all pairs of other individuals that include the focal
individual.
From the aspect of biological analogues, Popularity can
therefore be viewed as the self-reinforcing ability to attract social
connections, Closeness as the ability to influence other individuals
in a group and the ease of doing so, while Betweenness describes
how well an individual is positioned to act as a necessary
intermediary in a group or population. While biological analogues
of these centrality measures can certainly be envisioned, the
association between social importance and particular centrality
metric will likely be specific for the social system in question. In
other words, high Popularity will mean advantageous social
position in one social system or species, and characterize
something completely different, or indeed opposite, in another.
It is therefore not our intention here to equate the chosen
centrality metric with a particular context or a particular taxon.
Rather, we use these metrics to demonstrate the as-of-yet
untapped potential to use network theory to study emerging social
complexity in animal groups. With successful illustration of these
principles, it is our hope that their generality will stimulate future
research in specific systems which will then utilize metrics that
characterize socially (dis)advantageous positions specific relevant
to the biological example in question.
Simulations
The simulations of the models were developed using Java
programming language (Java 1.6.0 API). The preference of each
individual vi for a certain measure of partner centrality was
determined at the outset of computation and all individuals in a
given network had the same preference (i.e. only a single
phenotype) which remained unchanged throughout the simulation
(i.e. no phenotypic plasticity). An affiliation network was therefore
Systems Approach and Sociality
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C- and P-) individuals that all attempted to maintain connections
with partners with the highest B- (resp. C- and P-) centrality. Each
simulation started at iteration t=1 when a network (B-, C-, or P-)
was initialized. Initially, each individual vi was assigned five out-
neighbors at random, and in each subsequent iteration vi changed
its set of out-neighbors by dropping its connections to two of the
five existing out-neighbors and replacing them with two others.
Which two connections were dropped by vi depended on vi’s
affiliation preference, i.e. its network type. For example, if vi was a
B-individual, then the B-centrality of vi’s five current out-neighbors
were ranked and vi removed its affiliation to the two current out-
neighbors with the lowest values of B-centrality. The two
replacement out-neighbors were then chosen at random from all
other individuals in the network, with the restriction that the two
individuals just dropped could not have been re-chosen as
replacements during the same iteration. In addition to the B-,
C- and P-networks, where individuals changed their out-neighbors
according to their prescribed preferences, we also defined an R-
network (comprised of R-individuals) to be one where each
individual both dropped and replaced two out-neighbors during
each iteration completely at random. Such R-networks served as a
null-model and provided the means to compare the relative
success, and consistency of success, for individuals in the affiliation-
driven B-, C- and P-networks.
As well as the models themselves, the simulation parameters
were designed so as to be comparable to those from Fefferman and
Ng [21]. Each simulation ran for t=200 iterations, and a total of
300 simulations were performed for each network type to ensure
the size of the sample was adequate given the stochastic nature of
the simulations. For each individual the values of B-, C-, and P-
centrality were computed at every iteration t. Though each
measure of centrality provided a numerical value for each
individual’s status at each iteration, the numerical values of
centrality metrics are highly contingent on properties specific to
the actual setup, such as group size [13,14]. As the primary focus
of this demonstration was to compare relative success of
individuals in a generalized network and not to test a particular
set of conditions, measures associated with each individual were
ranked for each network and at every iteration t (from the largest
to the smallest, allowing for ties if two or more individuals had the
same centrality values) with respect to the centrality of all other
individuals in a network. This allowed us to determine the relative
value of each individual’s centrality at every iteration. We also
assumed that immediate short-term fluctuations in rank position
should be less important than longer-term averages in relative
status when stability is concerned. As a result, we averaged the
ranks of individuals over intervals of 20 iterations, yielding T=10
time intervals from each experiment over which we calculated
rank-average values. This resulted in a composite measure
describing the centrality position an individual held in a group
for a given period of time and with it also its success in obtaining
the expected returns from continued membership in a stable,
organized social group.
Determining personal centrality maximization success
Assuming that high centrality corresponds to high fitness, we set
out to determine whether individuals would experience increased
expectation to gain from sociality by using social organization rules
based on free association. We therefore evaluated whether or not
each organizational rule resulted an increase in relative standing in
the group.
We first evaluated the maximum attainable centrality for each
chosen metric and within each network type. Individuals were
ranked according to their absolute centrality, and the centralities
of the highest ranking individuals in each group were then
compared across networks. For each centrality metric compar-
ison, we used the highest ranking individual for that particular
metric, e.g. to compare which rules are the best for generating
high P-centrality, we used the highest ranking P-centrality
individual from each network. The results were then analyzed
using Kruskal-Wallis test, and multiple comparisons with R-
network values were performed according to Siegel and Castellan
[49].
We then evaluated how many individuals were able to enjoy
elevated social position. Success of an individual in an interacting
group was linked to its ability to attain a lasting increase in relative
centrality rank, and to continuously increase its centrality rank
relative to other individuals in a group. To determine whether
individuals could expect to experience increased rank in the course
of the social organization, we recorded whether an individual was
able to consistently maintain a relative rank that was higher than
the one it held in the initial time interval of a simulation (for .7
out of 9 time intervals). The average number of individuals in non-
random networks that were able to maintain higher than initial
rank under the same criteria was then compared with the numbers
obtained from R-networks. We recorded these values indepen-
dently over time intervals, i.e. the sequence of intervals during
which an individual held an elevated rank did not matter. This
enabled us to assess the consistency in maintaining increased rank
regardless of the number of separate occasions during which
individuals were able to do so. The obtained values were
transformed using square root transformation [50], and then
analyzed using ANOVA followed by Tukey’s HSD test for
comparisons of C-centrality, and Welch ANOVA followed by
Games-Howell test for comparisons of B- and P-centrality due to
unequal variances between groups.
To examine whether individuals in a given network could
expect to experience substantial upward trends in centrality, we
recorded the number of times an individual increased its relative
centrality rank between successive time intervals. We further
recorded the average number of individuals per network that
experienced rank increase between successive time intervals 7 or
more (out of maximum of 9) times, and compared the results from
non-random networks with those obtained from the R-networks to
evaluate the effects of affiliation strategies on increased expectation
of rank improvement. The obtained values were again trans-
formed using square root transformation, and then analyzed using
ANOVA (variances among groups were homoscedastic) followed
by two-tailed Dunnett’s q tests for comparisons against the R-
network results.
To determine whether individual- and group-level outcomes
were acting on the fitness of individuals in either conflict or
concordance, the expected personal centrality success of individ-
uals was then compared to group-wide centrality measures for the
same scenarios previously published and described by Fefferman
and Ng [21].
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